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This paper reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link between risky decisions
made by couples, and risky decisions made separately by each spouse. We estimate both the
individuals and the couples’ degrees of risk aversion, and we analyze how the risk preferences of
the two spouses aggregate when they have to perform joint decisions under risk. We show that the
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11 Introduction
Almost every important economic decision involves risk, and a substantial body of research has tried
to understand how individuals incorporate risk into their decisions. However, only a tiny portion of
this literature have been devoted to the study of household decision-making under risk. This focus on
individual decision-making is unfortunate as in many day-to-day life contexts (ﬁnancial investments,
residential location, insurance), decisions are taken by a household rather than by a single individual.
Even when these decisions are formally taken by only one of the members of the household, they may
aﬀect (and/or be aﬀected by) the way the household shares other decisions.
This paper reports on an experimental test of couple decision-making under risk. A sample of
22 couples is presented with tasks involving binary choices between a lottery and a sure payoﬀ. In
the ﬁrst part of the experiment spouses are separated and face choices separately. In the second
part of the experiment male spouses rejoin their partner and they make choices as a couple. Couples
are video-recorded while making joint decisions. We estimate both the individuals and the couples’
degrees of risk aversion, and we analyze how the risk preferences of the two spouses aggregate when
they have to perform joint decisions under risk. In our attempt to explain how individual preferences
towards risk can be aggregated to determine couple decisions, we particularly focus on the inﬂuence
of ultimate control, i.e., we assess the relative gain in decision power obtained by the spouse who
ultimately implements the couple decisions.
The relation between individual preferences and joint decisions within the couple is not yet very
well understood by standard economic theory. The main diﬃculty is that the individual preferences
cannot be easily aggregated. As pointed out by Chiappori (1988), joint decision making has a diﬀerent
meaning within a couple and in other contexts such as professional interactions. The main diﬀerences
between couples (or more generally families) and other groups are that (a) a large degree of altruism
usually takes place within the couple, and (b) spouses usually have more occasions (and willingness)
to share information. However, they usually do not share the same preferences. This means that the
preferences of two spouses (of course not identical) cannot be represented by a single standard utility
function.
In a situation without risk, the way Chiappori (1988) proposes to approach this problem is to as-
sume that the utility of a family is a weighted average of the utilities of its members; the (endogenous)
weights depend on all individual characteristics and reﬂect the respective bargaining powers. Chiap-
pori’s approach amounts to assume that the negotiation leads to an eﬃcient (that is Pareto-optimal)
solution which is consistent with any eﬃcient negotiation process. The weights of each spouse’s utility
are then called Pareto weights. If the Pareto weights were constant (that is, would not depend on
any individual or family characteristics such as prices, wages or individual wealth), then the family
could be represented by a single standard utility function. This corresponds to the so called unitary
approach. This implies, for example, income pooling condition: in the unitary approach, decisions
made by the family should not be aﬀected by the source of income or wealth (that is, should be
independent from who earns or possesses assets and ﬁnancial resources within the couple). On the
other hand, when the Pareto weights are not constant, this means, for example, that the bargaining
powers change when individual wages or wealth, or the value of individual investments changes. In
this case, there is no simple and intuitive relation between the spouses’ and the couple risk aversions.
In particular, it is not the case that, for a given question, the joint decision should be between the
spouses’ decisions.
2Income pooling has been repeatedly rejected empirically in diﬀerent cultural contexts. See, for
example, Vermeulen (2002) for a survey on collective models and critics of the unitary approach.
Therefore, more and more studies (both theoretical and empirical) concerned with couple decisions
are now written within the collective framework (` a la Chiappori). However, when risk is involved in
the decision, most of the literature still relies on the unitary approach. Among the few exceptions are
Donni (2003) and Mazzocco (2004). The last author shows that, in a collective model, an increase
in the risk aversion of one member may induce household to take more risk (this counter-intuitive
result comes from opposing impacts of individual risk aversion on individual decision and on Pareto
weights). Indeed, the Households Retirement Survey data show that the risk aversion of couples in
which the woman’s risk aversion is very high, is a U−shaped function of the man’s risk aversion.
Bateman and Munro (2005a,b) pioneer experimental tests of household decision-making. Bateman
and Munro (2005a) presents results of an experiment designed to investigate the extent to which
decisions made by couples and decisions made separately by spouses conform to the axioms of expected
utility theory. They ﬁnd that choices made by couples exhibit the same kinds of patterns (e.g. the
common ratio and common consequence eﬀects) as are regularly recorded with individuals. Bateman
and Munro (2005b) reports on a choice experiment using reductions in dietary health risks as the
vehicle. In one treatment a random individual is chosen from the couple and takes part in a face-to-
face interview; in the other treatment, both partners are asked questions jointly, again in a face-to-face
interview. They ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the values elicited in the two treatments, and the values
elicited from couples are not a simple average of those elicited from men and women.
The road map of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design. In Section 3,
we introduce the ordinal measure of risk aversion that we use to analyze the data. We also propose
a typology, that describes the aggregation of the decisions of the spouses, and we describe the evo-
lution over time of the respective decision powers. Finally, we introduce a cardinal measure of risk
aversion (assuming constant absolute risk aversion utility), and measure risk aversion using discrete
choice models techniques. A quantitative analysis of the couples’ discussions is provided in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
Experimentalists rely on several risk assessment methods. One method consists in eliciting buying
and/or selling prices for a given lottery using mechanisms such as a Vickrey auction or the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak procedure.1 Another method consists in observing choices that subjects make
over lotteries that vary the prizes oﬀered for given probabilities (e.g., Binswanger, 1980) or varying
the probabilities of winning given prizes (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002). This latter method is usually
operationalized by presenting a ﬁxed array of paired alternatives to subjects and asking each subject
to pick one of the two alternatives in each row. One of the disadvantages of this Multiple Price List
(MPL) procedure is that it could be susceptible to framing eﬀects, as subjects are drawn to the middle
of the ordered table irrespective of their true values.2
We elicited measures of risk aversion by means of choice bracketing procedures, also referred to as
1As shown by Karni and Safra (1987), these mechanisms are however not incentive compatible when the object being
valued is a lottery.
2Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom (2004) consider the disadvantages of the MPL procedure, propose extensions
which can address each, and evaluate those extensions in controlled laboratory experiments where they elicit measures
of risk aversion and discount rates for individuals.
3investment series. In each step of the bracketing procedure, the decision maker (either an individual
or a couple) had to choose between a safe and a risky alternative. Risky alternatives were simple
monetary lotteries, modeling the toss of a fair coin, i.e., yielding a low (resp., high) payoﬀ with
probability 1/2. Potential payoﬀs and probabilities were always known to the decision makers and, in
a given bracketing procedure, the safe alternative was a sure amount ranging from the low outcome of
the lottery to the high outcome of the lottery. All details concerning the bracketing procedures and
the lotteries are to be found in the Appendix.
2.1 Experimental sessions and participants
Seven experimental sessions were carried out from January 2005 to February 2005. Subjects were
recruited from the city of Jena (Germany) via local newspaper advertisements, through community
groups and using posters in the city center. Session sizes varied from 2 to 4 couples and were held at
the experimental economics video laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena. In
recruiting, we required all individuals to be over 30, to be living with their partners and to have been
together as a couple for at least one year. We recruited 22 couples for our experiment. At the beginning
of the experiment, we asked a few warm-up questions to the spouses separately about themselves and
about the couple (see step 1 of section 1 in the experimental procedures sum-up below). The main
characteristics are brieﬂy summarized now.
Average payoﬀs were just above 50 e per individual—more than ﬁve times the median hourly
post-tax wage for an adult working in the former East Germany in 2005. Ages ranged from 21 to 64,
with a mean of 43.3 Approximately 73% of individuals stated that they were married to their current
partner and all the couples in our sample were heterosexual. On average, couples had been together
for 15 years (median of 17), with a maximum of 42 and a minimum of less than 1.4 Interestingly, the
union duration stated by women is on average 1 year more than the duration stated by men, with
a maximum diﬀerence of 12 years. This diﬀerence may be explained by the fact that the man only
considered marriage duration, whereas the woman considered the total duration, including the period
they were living together before they got married. On average, couples had 1.3 children together. In
addition, the women (men) had on average 0.3 (resp. 0.5) children from previous union(s). These
ﬁgures are quite representative of the German population (see Lechner, 2001).
2.2 Progress of an experimental session
Before entering the video laboratory, couples were reminded that decisions would be implemented on
computers (this information had already been provided in the invitation mail) and they were told
that they could ask for help at any point in time during the experimental session. Couples were
also informed that the session would take place in a video laboratory and that part of the session
would be video-recorded.5 Finally, it was mentioned to the couples that the session would consist of
several parts (no details concerning the diﬀerent parts were provided at that point of time) and that
instructions for each part would be delivered in due time.
Upon entering the video laboratory, couples were separated: each male entered one of the odd
3One couple was below the required age of 30 years. Both were students aged 21-22.
4Only the couple of students had a union duration of less than one year.
5Couples were also told that if they did not feel like being recorded then they could leave immediately and that they
would get a compensation of 20 e per person. All couples decided to stay and take part in the experiment.
4numbered cabins and each female entered one of the even numbered cabins.6 The ﬁrst section of the
experiment was therefore conducted with the two spouses in diﬀerent cabins; pairs then rejoined each
other for the second section of the experiment.
The ﬁrst section of the experiment started with the elicitation of the participants’ socioeconomic
characteristics (level of education, post-tax monthly salary, etc.). Next, the separated subjects had
to estimate their inﬂuence on the couple decision in every day life situations. After answering this
questionnaire, each subject was endowed with 40 e. Finally, the separated subjects went through
six investment series: in the ﬁrst three series, separated subjects had to invest part or all of their
own endowment into risky options, whereas during the last three series each subject had to invest
part or all of the couple endowment into risky options. Before going through the six series of risky
investments, subjects were told that they would have to go through twelve investment series and that,
at the end of the experiment, one series would be chosen at random and one of the choices in this
series would be played for real.7 The subjects were given details of how the payout procedures would
operate only at the end of the experiment.
In the second section of the experiment, couples made choices jointly and this section has been
video-recorded. Concretely, male partners were asked to join their female partners in their cabin and
choices were made on the computer previously used by the female partner. Couples went through six
investment series. They had the possibility to discuss but no speciﬁc instructions as to how the couple
decisions should be made were provided (and no explicit time limit was given). Most couples went
through the six series of risky investments in less than 15 minutes, which indicates that agreements
were quite easily reached. Except for ﬁve couples, the female partner always entered the couple
decisions into the computer.
The incentive system was a follows. First, one of the two partners had to randomly draw a card
from a pile of ﬁve cards, one card being numbered one, two cards being numbered two, and two
cards being numbered three. If the card numbered one was randomly drawn then the payoﬀ-relevant
decision was determined separately for each partner: the male partner went back to his cabin and
each partner’s paid decision was determined according to two random draws, one random draw to
determine the series and the other random draw to determine which decision in the series. If a card
numbered two was randomly drawn then the payoﬀ-relevant decision for the couple was determined:
ﬁrst, a random draw decided whether one of the female or one of the male decisions to invest the couple
endowment would be paid, and second, two additional random draws were made in order to select
the series and the decision in the randomly selected series. If a card numbered three was randomly
drawn then the payoﬀ-relevant decision for the couple was determined: two random draws were made
in order to select the series and the decision in the randomly selected series.
The computer screens that subjects saw while going through the two sections of the experiment
have been translated and reproduced in the Appendix. Additional material of the experimental ses-
sions, like the written instructions and the payment procedures, is available upon request from the
authors. Below, we summarize our experimental procedures.
6The experimental economics video laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena comprises 8 sound-
proof cabins. Each cabin provides in- and output for video- and audio signals. In addition, each cabin is equipped with
a personal computer. See Baumann and Schmidt (2004) for details.
7Payoﬀ-relevant investments were preceded by a training series of ten investments.
5Experimental procedures
Section 1 of the experiment: Spouses are separated
In step 1, each spouse is asked to answer questions concerning his/her personal characteristics as well as
concerning the couple characteristics. In the last three steps, each spouse goes through several investment
series. In each series, the spouse has to invest a certain amount of money either in a lottery, modeling the
toss of a fair coin, or in a sure payoﬀ. Sure payoﬀs range from the low outcome of the lottery to the high
outcome of the lottery.
• Step 1. Characteristics of the individual/couple: First, each spouse is asked to answer questions
concerning his/her personal characteristics (age, job status, etc.). Second, each spouse is asked to answer
questions concerning his/her ﬁnancial status (income, real estate, etc.). Finally, the decision power of each
spouse in some of the couple decisions is elicited.
After answering all the questions, each spouse collects 40 e as a reward.
• Step 2. Training investment series: Each spouse goes through an investment series which is not
payoﬀ-relevant. Each investment decision consists in investing 50 e.
• Step 3. Investment series 1, 2, and 3: Each spouse goes through three payoﬀ-relevant investment
series. In the ﬁrst series, each spouse invests 20 out of the 40 e he/she collected. In the second and third
series, each spouse invests the entire 40 e.
• Step 4. Investment series 4, 5, and 6: Each spouse goes through three payoﬀ-relevant investment
series. In the ﬁrst series, each spouse invests 40 out of the 80 e the couple collected. In the second and
third series, each spouse invests the entire 80 e.
Section 2 of the experiment: Spouses are together
In step 5, the couple goes through three investment series. In each series, the couple has to invest a certain
amount of money either in a lottery, modeling the toss of a fair coin, or in a sure payoﬀ. Sure payoﬀs range
from the low outcome of the lottery to the high outcome of the lottery. In steps 6 to 8, the couple goes
through three investment series, including 3 questions each. In each series, the couple has to invest a certain
amount of money either in a lottery (speciﬁc to each question), modeling the toss of a fair coin, or in a sure
payoﬀ (which does not vary within a series). In each series, the lottery proposed in the second question
depends on the answer to the ﬁrst question, and the lottery proposed in the third question depends on the
answer to the ﬁrst and second questions.
• Step 5. Investment series 7, 8, and 9: The couple goes through three payoﬀ-relevant investment
series. In the ﬁrst series, the couple invests 40 out of the 80 e the couple collected. In the second and third
series, the couple invests the entire 80 e.
• Step 6. Investment series 10: Both the amount invested and the sure payoﬀ are 80 e. The couple
may loose half of the 80 e in the worst case and increase their payoﬀ up to 140 e in the best case. The
expected payoﬀ of all lotteries is 90 e, and the variability of the payoﬀ is increased if the couple previously
selected the lottery, decreased if they previously selected the sure payoﬀ.
• Step 7. Investment series 11: Similar to investment series 10, except that the safe payoﬀ is now 90 e
(all amounts in the ﬁrst question are increased by 10 e).
• Step 8. Investment series 12: Similar to investment series 11, except that there is no risk of any loss
(the payoﬀ in the worst case is 80 e), and instead of increasing/decreasing the variance, only one outcome
is increased/decreased depending on the answer to the previous question.
3 Results
In this section, we ﬁrst assess the decision makers degrees of risk aversion by relying on an ordinal
approach. To do so, we restrict ourselves to the choices made by the spouses separately in investment
6series 4 to 6 (step 4), and to the choices made by the couples in investment series 7 to 9 (step 5).
Indeed, in investment series 4 (resp., 5 and 6) each spouse was assigned to the same lottery, and this
lottery was also the one used in investment series 7 (resp., 8 and 9) when both spouses decided jointly.
Therefore, the individual and couple answers can be compared directly.
Second, we assume that the spouses are expected utility maximizers with a constant absolute risk
aversion utility function. This enables us to use individual choices in investment series 1 to 6 in order
to assess the spouses degrees of risk aversion. We then determine the amount of money (compensating
variation) a spouse is willing to pay in order to replace the couple’s answer with her/his preferred
answer when both answers diﬀer. Finally, we look at the evolution of the individual compensating
variations during the experimental session which enables us to assess the evolution of the individual
decision powers.
Both in the cardinal and in the ordinal approach, we allow for choices violating the assumption
that preferences are monotonic with respect to money.
3.1 The ordinal approach
Measuring risk attitudes
In each investment series j, the decision maker faces 11 choices (i = 1,...,11) between a lottery Lj
and a sure payoﬀ Sj(i). The lottery yields the low payoﬀ Sj(11) and the high payoﬀ Sj(1) with equal
probabilities. Sure payoﬀs are such that Sj(i) = Sj(11) + 11−i
10 (Sj(1) − Sj(11)), i = 1,...,11. Note
that the expected value of the lottery is equal to Sj(6), so that a risk-neutral decision maker will be
indiﬀerent between the lottery and Sj(6).
The set of choices made by a decision maker facing investment series j is inconsistent if monotonic
and transitive preferences cannot explain those choices. Table 1 shows, for each investment series, the
relative frequency of inconsistent sets of choices for women, men and couples. Overall, there were 23%
(resp., 13% and 9%) of inconsistent sets of choices for women (resp., for men and for couples). Most
of the women inconsistent sets of choices were made in the 3 ﬁrst series which suggests that women
need more than one training investment series in order to get acquainted with the task.
Investment series Woman Man Couple
1 (Woman & Man) 9/22 2/22
2 (Woman & Man) 7/22 3/22
3 (Woman & Man) 6/22 3/22
4 (Woman & Man) / 7 (Couple) 2/22 3/22 2/22
5 (Woman & Man) / 8 (Couple) 2/22 2/22 1/22
6 (Woman & Man) / 9 (Couple) 4/22 4/22 3/22
Table 1: Relative frequencies of inconsistent series of choice.
A consistent set of choices is characterized by a switching point, i ∈ {0,...,11}: for a given
investment series j, decision maker k in class i prefers lottery Lj to all deterministic amounts lower
than or equal to Sj(i + 1) and prefers all amounts larger than or equal to Sj(i) to lottery Lj. In this
case, we denote by k the risk preference relation of decision maker k, uniquely deﬁned on the set
{Lj,Sj(i),i = 1,...,11} by his/her set of replies to series j. More speciﬁcally, Sj(i) k Lj means that
7decision maker k prefers the sure payoﬀ Sj(i) to the lottery Lj. Given the construction of the series,
the classes are ranked by increasing risk aversion, which deﬁnes an ordinal measure of risk aversion.
Out of the 211 potential sets of choices in a given investment series, only 12 are consistent, which
deﬁnes 12 ordered classes of risk aversion. They are represented in Table 2, together with the frequen-
cies of observed answers in each series, for women, men, and couples.
Switching Set of Investment series: Woman, Man; Couple
point consistent choices 1 2 3 4;7 5;8 6;9
0 Lj k Sj(1) 1,0
1 Sj(1) k Lj k Sj(2)
2 Sj(2) k Lj k Sj(3)
3 Sj(3) k Lj k Sj(4) 1,1
4 Sj(4) k Lj k Sj(5) 0,1 0,1 0,1 1,0;0 1,0;0
5 Sj(5) k Lj k Sj(6) 0,3 1,2 5,1 1,1;2 1,1;2 0,0;1
6 Sj(6) k Lj k Sj(7) 5,7 1,3 6,8 4,7;6 4,6;2 6,7;5
7 Sj(7) k Lj k Sj(8) 1,0 2,6 1,3 4,5;4 5,3;0 4,3;4
8 Sj(8) k Lj k Sj(9) 3,5 5,3 1,4 5,2;7 2,6;13 3,4;5
9 Sj(9) k Lj k Sj(10) 2,3 0,1 2,2;1 2,2;4 0,1;4
10 Sj(10) k Lj k Sj(11) 1,0 2,0 1,1 0,1;0 2,1;0 1,1;0
11 Sj(11) k Lj (Lj − OR) 1,3 2,1 2,0 3,1;0 3,1;0 4,2;0
Table 2: The 12 sets of consistent choices.
We observe that a signiﬁcant proportion of individuals (especially women) are willing to receive
always less money just for the beneﬁt of avoiding any risk (15 out of 22 ∗ 6 women-series and 8 out
of 22 ∗ 6 men-series). We denote by Locally Opposed to Risk for lottery Lj (Lj−OR), those decision
makers who consistently prefer any sure payoﬀ Sj(i), i = 1,...,11, to lottery Lj in investment series
j. Interestingly enough, Lj−OR preferences were never shared by both spouses in a couple nor by
the two spouses together, i.e., no Lj−OR individual was able to convince his/her spouse. Moreover,
we denote by Systematically Opposed to Risk (SOR) those decision makers who were Lj−OR for the
6 series Lj, j = 1,...,6. We did observe one SOR (female) respondent in our database and had to
exclude her from some estimates because SOR preferences correspond to an inﬁnite risk aversion.
In order to take into account inconsistent sets of choices, the total number of “safe” choices will
be used as an indicator of risk aversion. More precisely, for a given investment series, we rely on
the frequency of choices where the decision maker picked the sure payoﬀ instead of the lottery to
measure the respondent risk aversion. Needless to say, we obtain the same measure of risk aversion
for a consistent series whether we rely on this indicator or whether we rely on the switching point.
Man, woman and couple risk attitudes
Figure 1 shows the empirical distributions of safe choices in the three investment series concerned with
individual money, separately for women and men. Both for women and men, the distribution is more
spread for the ﬁrst series, and some respondents appear extremely risk lovers. This may reﬂect the
fact that one training series was not enough and that some respondents answered randomly in the
ﬁrst series because they were not acquainted with the task.
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Figure 1: Empirical distributions of safe choices, individual money.
with couple money, separately for women, men and couples (spouses together). In all three investment
series, the distribution of couple choices is more concentrated than the distribution of spouse choices.
Not that the vertical axis scale was changed for investment series 8, couples because, for this series,
the number of safe choices was 8 for 14 couples.
Both ﬁgures suggest that women are slightly more risk averse than men, and that men and women
answers are more heterogeneous than couples answers. This is conﬁrmed in Table 3, which shows
the average frequencies of safe choices for the woman, the man and for the couple in the diﬀerent
investment series, as well as their diﬀerences. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.
Investment Diﬀerence Diﬀerence Diﬀerence
series Woman Man Couple Woman-Couple Man-Couple Woman-Man
1 6.27 6.73 −.50
(2.57) (2.18) (3.69)
2 8.23 7.36 .86
(1.60) (1.68) (2.57)
3 6.59 6.77 −.18
(1.89) (1.60) (2.34)
4/7 7.50 7.36 6.95 .55 .41 .14
(1.87) (1.53) (1.09) (1.84) (1.37) (2.28)
5/8 7.86 7.59 7.73 .14 −.14 .27
(2.03) (1.53) (1.16) (2.21) (1.49) (2.86)
6/9 7.45 7.36 7.27 .18 .09 .09
(2.06) (1.89) (1.20) (1.92) (2.14) (3.00)
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Figure 2: Empirical distributions of safe choices, couple money.
Concerning investment series 1 to 3 (individual money), women and men answers cannot be directly
compared for because the amounts involved were generated randomly, independently for the woman
and for the man. Table 3 supports the idea that individuals (especially women) answered more
randomly in series 1, since the average frequency of safe choices is lower8 and the standard deviations
(of individual answers and of their diﬀerences) are larger for series 1 than for series 2 and 3. Individual
answers to series 1 to 3 are more relevant for computing individual risk aversions (see Section 3.2).
Concerning investment series 4 to 9 (couple money), women are (slightly) more risk averse than
men. Moreover, the average couple tends to be less risk averse than its average members. Indeed, the
average measure of risk aversion for couples is systematically lower than the average measure of risk
aversion for women and it is lower than the average measure of risk aversion for men in 2 out of the
3 investment series. The variance of the diﬀerence between men and women measures of risk aversion
increases over time. The variance of the diﬀerence between the couples and the men measures of risk
aversion also increases over time contrary to the variance of the diﬀerence between the couples and the
women measures of risk aversion which exhibits no monotonic pattern. In conclusion, after controlling
for the average diﬀerence between women, men and couples measures of risk aversion, the distance
between couples and men measures of risk aversion increases, whereas the distance between couples
and women measures of risk aversion remains constant. This suggests that the relative decision power
of the woman when the couple is facing a unique decision increases over time. This is a ﬁrst indication
of the power of the individual who has ultimate control over the implementation of the decision, since
8The average would be 5.5 for pure random choices, which is lower than the observed average of 7 to 8 for the other
series.
10the woman was implementing the choices in most couples.
A typology of couples
Figure 3 shows, separately for each pair of respondents, the measures of risk aversion of the two
members of the couple as well as the measure of risk aversion of the couple. Women measures are
represented by “×”, men measures are represented by “+”, and the two measures are linked by a
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Figure 3: Woman, man, and couple frequency of safe choices for each pair of respondents.
In most cases, the couple measure belongs to the woman-man risk aversion interval. The lowest
measure of risk aversion is 4 and the highest measure of risk aversion is 11. Most individuals and
couples are either risk neutral or risk averse. Two important exceptions are couples 11, in which the
man (couples 11 and 21) and couple (couple 21) are consistently risk lover, whereas the woman is
either risk neutral or risk averse, depending on the series. The woman in couple 4 displays each of the
three risk-aversion categories, whereas the corresponding man and couple are clearly and consistently
risk averse. Figure 3 suggests a typology of couples, according to the way they manage to aggregate
their risk attitudes. The typology we consider covers three dimensions:
1. Comparison between man and woman risk aversion. In the “Normal” case, the measure of risk
aversion of the woman is the greatest. In the “Reversed” case, the measure of risk aversion of
the man is the greatest, and they are identical in the “Twin” case.
2. Location of the couple risk aversion with respect to the woman-man risk aversion interval:
between the man’s and woman’s risk aversion in the Convergent case (strict inequalities in the
Normal and Divergent cases, equality in the Twin case); outside (strict inequality) the interval
in the Divergent case, and equal to one of the boundaries in the Polarized case (only in the
Normal and Reversed cases).
113. In the Divergent case and in the Polarized case, the couple decision can be either on the man
side or on the woman side. In the Twin case, we use the term “+” when the couple risk aversion
is larger than the common risk aversion of the spouses, and “−” otherwise.
Table 4 represents, for the three investment series, the distribution of the 22 couples according to
this typology. Note that women are often more risk averse than men (see also Table 3 and Figure 2).
In 13 investment series out of 66, the risk aversion of the couple is outside the man/woman risk aver-
sion interval, that is, it corresponds to the divergent case. This ﬁnding is in line with the theoretical
results of Mazzocco (2004) who shows that the risk aversion of the couple might not be a convex
combination of the risk aversions of the spouses (see also Bateman and Munro, 2005a,b). We rank the
13 types of couples so that they reﬂect the woman decision power.9 According to this typology, the
decision power belongs to the man in 35% of the couples for all the investment series. The fraction
of couples for which the decision belongs to the woman doubles from 5% in investment series 4/7 to
18% in investment series 6/9. In the ﬁrst investment series, only one couple is clearly inﬂuenced by
the woman, while in the last investment series 4 couples are dominated by the woman. This is a
second indication that the decision power of women increases over time. Interestingly enough, there
is no signiﬁcant correlation between the inferred decision powers of the spouses as measured by the
numbers of polarized and divergent answers (see bottom of Table 4) and the stated decision powers
of the spouses collected in step 1 of the questionnaire.
Investment series
4 / 7 5 / 8 6 / 9
Convergent 3 4 3
Woman 0 1 1
Divergent
Normal Man 3 1 1
Woman 0 0 1
Polarized
Man 3 3 3
Convergent 4 2 2
Twin + 1 1 1
Divergent
− 0 1 1
Convergent 5 4 4
Woman 0 0 0
Divergent
Reversed Man 0 0 1
Woman 1 1 2
Polarized
Man 2 4 2
Woman 1 2 4
Total=Divergent+Polarized
Man 8 8 7
Table 4: Typology of the couples.
9This ranking is somewhat arbitrary, and mainly reﬂects the judgment of the authors.
12The power of ultimate control
Our previous analyzes suggest that the woman decision power increases during the progress of an
experimental session. Note that, in most cases, the woman implemented the choices of the couple, i.e.,
she had ultimate control. In order to establish the power of ultimate control, we turn now to linear
regressions where the dependent variable is the couple measure of risk aversion. In our ﬁrst model, the
independent variables are the woman and the man measures of risk aversion. In our second model,
the independent variables consist of the measure of risk aversion of the spouse who had ultimate
control and of the measure of risk aversion of the other spouse, irrespective of the gender. Finally,
in our third model, we only include those couples were the woman had ultimate control so that the
two interpretations of the coeﬃcients coincide. Our regression results, for each investment series, are
displayed in Table 5.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Woman= Man=
Series Woman Man Ad. R2 UC No UC Ad. R2 UC No UC Ad. R2
4/7 0.152 0.332M 0.241 0.240 0.218∗ 0.204 0.252 0.338M 0.357
5/8 0.149 0.370M 0.155 0.346M 0.139 0.151 0.383N 0.408N 0.502
6/9 0.253M 0.107 0.109 0.258∗ 0.128 0.101 0.290∗ 0.066 0.066
# obs 22 22 17
Notes: N, M, ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at 1−, 5−, and 10−percent level, respectively.
“UC” denotes ultimate control. “Ad. R2” denotes adjusted R2.
Table 5: Regression of couple risk aversion on respective spouses risk aversion.
According to the estimation results of our ﬁrst model, the inﬂuence of the man risk aversion is
highly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst two investment series, but it becomes non-signiﬁcant in the last investment
series. On the contrary, the inﬂuence of the woman risk aversion is not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst two
investment series, but it is highly signiﬁcant in the last investment series. According to the estimation
results of our second model, only the spouse who does not have ultimate control over the joint decisions
has some decision power in the ﬁrst investment series, and he/she looses decision power in the last
two investment series whereas the power of the mouse holder increases in the second investment series
and remains signiﬁcant in the last series. Finally, the estimation results of our third model show that
the woman has a marginal decision power in the ﬁrst investment series, which gets signiﬁcant in the
second investment series and remains signiﬁcant in the last investment series. The man has most of
the decision power in the ﬁrst investment series, he shares it in the second investment series, and he
looses completely his decision power in the last series. In conclusion, the man initially leads the joint
decisions, but the woman gets more and more decision power over time, and this happens earlier when
she has ultimate control.
Note that the explanatory power
 
adjusted R2
of our third model is signiﬁcantly larger than the
explanatory power of our ﬁrst two models (except for the last investment series). This suggests that
all the observations used in the third model are linked by the same model, whereas the ﬁrst two models
are some mixtures of two diﬀerent models. More precisely, this suggests that the respective decision
powers of the man and the woman are diﬀerent and evolve diﬀerently depending on who holds the
mouse.
133.2 The cardinal approach
We now assume that the preferences of any spouse in our sample can be represented by a utility
function with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) for money x > 0. Individual k’s utility function
is therefore given by Vk(x) = V (x;θk) = (1 − exp(−θk x))/θk where θk is the individual-speciﬁc level
of absolute risk aversion. In investment series j, the utility of the safe alternative Sj(i) is Vk (Sj(i)),
while the expected utility of the lottery is given by
E[Vk (Lj)] =
Vk (Sj(11)) + Vk (Sj(1))
2
.
The range of utility variation heavily depends on the value of θk. For the individual-speciﬁc values
of absolute risk aversion consistent with the series of answers by individual k, the diﬀerence between
the utility of the safe alternative and the expected utility of the lottery varies from −385 to +385.
The distribution of this diﬀerence is highly concentrated around 0 but it has extremely ﬂat tails.
For example, this diﬀerence (in absolute terms) exceeds 100 in 1.5% of the sample and it exceeds
10 in 14% of the sample. Moreover, this diﬀerence is less than 0.1 in absolute terms in 25% of the
sample, and less than 0.01 in 12% of the sample. In order to obtain comparable diﬀerences between
the utility of the safe alternative and the expected utility of the lottery, we divide this diﬀerence by
∆kj ≡ (Vk (Sj(1)) − Vk (Sj(11)))/2 > 0. So, individual k prefers lottery Lj to the safe alternative
Sj(i) (Lj k Sj(i)) if and only if
E[Vk (Lj)] − Vk (Sj(i))
∆kj
> 0.
Note that E[Vk (Lj)] − Vk (Sj(1)) = ∆kj and E[Vk (Lj)] − Vk (Sj(11)) = −∆kj. Therefore, we always
have
−1 ≤
E[Vk (Lj)] − Vk (Sj(i))
∆kj
≤ 1.
Individual k’s CARA utility function is monotonic with respect to money and therefore it cannot
accommodate inconsistent sets of choices. For this reason, we extent the deterministic choice rule by
introducing additive random terms which capture idiosyncratic errors as well as speciﬁcation errors.
We obtain the following probabilistic choice rule:
Pr(individual k chooses Lj rather than Sj(i)) = Pr

E[Vk (Lj)] − Vk (Sj(i))
∆kj
+ σ εijk > 0

,
where the εijk are identically and independently distributed according to the standard normal distri-
bution. Accordingly, the probability of choosing the lottery is large when E[Vk (Lj)] − Vk (Sj(i)) is




Vk (Sj(11)) − Vk (Sj(1))
2∆kj
+ σ εijk > 0







where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. Similarly, the prob-




, which is equal to
the probability of choosing the lottery rather than Sj(1), due to the symmetry of the standard normal
14distribution. Both probabilities do not depend on the risk aversion parameter θk.
Given individual k’s choices in investment series 1 to 6, we estimate θk by relying on a standard
maximum likelihood technique.10 Conditional on the standard deviation parameter σ, which is com-
mon to all individuals, the log-likelihood function can be maximized separately (with respect to θk)
for each individual. However, when the set of answers to a series is inconsistent and/or when the indi-
vidual’s answers to several series are not conform to CARA preferences,11 the log-likelihood is locally
ﬂat and not concave with respect to the parameter θk, and it displays several local extrema. Indeed,
hundreds of iterations were necessary before convergence was attained. In addition, we checked that
our estimates were robust to the starting values, i.e. that a global maximum was attained.12
Based on our estimations of the individual parameters, we compare the couples answers in invest-
ments series 7, 8, and 9 with the individual answers in investment series 4, 5, and 6. If individual k’s
answer to question i in investment series j ∈ {4,5,6} diﬀers from the couple’s answer to question i in
investment series j + 3 ∈ {7,8,9} then we compute the compensating variation CVijk, which corre-
sponds to the amount of money individual k is willing to pay in order to replace the couple’s answer
with his/her answer. If individual k selects the lottery Lj and the couple selects the safe amount
Sj+3(i), then the compensating variation solves13
Vk (Sj(1)) + Vk (Sj(11))
2











where log(·) denotes the natural logarithm. Similarly, if individual k selects the safe amount Sj(i) and










The compensating variation is positive if and only if the individual expected utility obtained when
the couple’s answer is implemented is lower than the individual expected utility obtained when the
individual’s answer is implemented. For a given investment series and a given individual, we sum the
relative compensating variations over the questions: RCVjk =
P11
i=1 CVijk/Sj(i). Table 6 shows the
relative compensating variations as well as the frequencies of positive compensating variations in the
diﬀerent investments series.
The number of questions with a positive compensating variation increases from series 4/7 to series
6/9 for the man, whereas it decreases for the woman (Model 1). Moreover, this number is about twice
for the respondent who does not hold the mouse compared to the respondent who holds the mouse
(Model 2). We now compare Model 3 (sample restricted to the 17 couples for which the mouse is
10The value of the risk aversion parameter which maximizes the probability to always choose the safe alternative
rather than the lottery in a given investment series is +∞. In case individual k always chose the safe alternative in all
investment series, we estimate θk by using an interval regression technique.
11See de Palma, Picard, and Prigent (2006) for the restrictions imposed by the CARA preferences when answering
several series of lotteries (additive invariance tests).





/θk. According to a likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis α = 0 cannot be rejected (likeli-
hood ratio test statistic = 0.219, p−value = 0.64).
13Recall that exactly the same questions were asked to each spouse in investment series j and to the couple in investment
series j + 3.
15Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Woman= Man=
Woman Man UC No UC UC No UC
Frequencies of 4/7 14 11 9 16 5 7
strictly positive 5/8 12 14 7 19 5 12
CVijk in series 6/9 11 14 7 18 6 13
Average 4/7 7.75% 3.89% 3.60% 8.03% 3.33% 3.69%
RCVjk 5/8 9.32% 9.03% 4.18% 14.2% 3.08% 9.36%
in series 6/9 1.74% 3.56% 6.57% 4.64% 0.83% 4.59%
# obs 22 22 17
Note: “UC” denotes ultimate control.
Table 6: Compensating variations.
held by the woman) with Model 1 (the mouse is held by the man in 5 couples out of 22). We observe
that the number of cases with positive CV is about the same in the two models for the man, which
suggests that when the man holds the mouse, the couple chooses according to his preference. Instead,
the number of positive CV is about twice in Model 1 compared to Model 2, which implies that there
are about as many cases with positive CV for the woman in the 5 couples for which the man held
the mouse than in the 17 couples for which the woman held the mouse. Consequently, the probability
that the woman looses when the couple decision is implemented rather than the woman decision is
signiﬁcantly increased when she does not hold the mouse.
Similar results are obtained when analyzing the value of the compensating variation rather than
restricting to its sign. The average relative compensating variation is reduced (approximately by one
half) for women when they hold the mouse (Model 3 versus Model 1), whereas it is approximately
the same for the men whether they hold the mouse or not. Moreover, the woman’s average relative
compensating variation is very close to zero for the last series when the woman holds the mouse (Model
3).
All these results conﬁrm that the man is generally more successful than the woman in inﬂuencing
couple decisions in risky situations, but the woman progressively acquires more power when she has
ultimate control over the implementation of the decision, that is when she holds the mouse.
4 Quantitative analysis of the discussions within the couple
In this section, we present a rather crude quantitative analysis of the discussions that couples had in
investment series 7 to 12 (a content analysis is beyond the scope of the present study). Two under-
graduate native raters independently watched the videos of 15 couples several times and evaluated the
talk duration of each spouse, i.e., the amount of time spent by each spouse talking to the other spouse
about which joint decision to implement.14 Both raters were instructed to exclude from talk duration
the amount of time spent by each spouse discussing topics not closely related to the experiment.
Table 7 shows the individual talk durations per investment series and per session as well as the
ratio between the woman talk duration and the couple talk duration for each of the 15 considered
pairs of respondents.
In all couples expect one, the man was always arguing much more about which joint decision to
14Unfortunately, seven out of the 22 videos had to be discarded because of the low quality of the sound.
16Investment series
Session Cabin Spouse 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total WTT/CTT
January 25, Man 29 19 11 10 24 25 118
2005 1 0.433
7 pm Woman 20 13 12 6 24 15 90
January 25, Man 44 33 50 27 37 12 203
2005 2 0.450
7 pm Woman 23 18 49 17 44 15 166
January 25, Man 44 38 36 14 20 37 189
2005 3 0.357
7 pm Woman 20 14 11 6 20 34 105
January 25, Man 8 18 26 17 28 8 105
2005 4 0.521
7 pm Woman 16 14 17 23 28 16 114
January 26, Man 25 20 22 30 31 36 164
2005 1 0.416
7 pm Woman 20 9 21 20 21 26 117
January 26, Man 52 13 29 30 20 8 152
2005 2 0.290
7 pm Woman 26 8 5 6 11 6 62
January 26, Man 4 3 7 3 31 17 65
2005 3 0.356
7 pm Woman 3 8 4 4 6 11 36
January 27, Man 13 9 11 14 21 10 78
2005 2 0.447
7 pm Woman 13 7 7 9 14 13 63
January 27, Man 70 51 42 43 34 28 268
2005 3 0.396
7 pm Woman 46 25 14 32 42 17 176
January 28, Man 51 44 21 19 19 31 185
2005 1 0.387
7 pm Woman 26 19 24 15 18 15 117
January 28, Man 24 34 25 24 34 25 166
2005 2 0.362
7 pm Woman 24 6 17 23 11 13 94
February 19, Man 38 11 13 16 20 29 127
2005 1 0.392
3 pm Woman 24 8 10 12 9 19 82
February 19, Man 48 30 22 30 30 35 195
2005 2 0.449
3 pm Woman 36 34 18 27 19 25 159
February 19, Man 42 20 8 3 6 10 89
2005 3 0.429
3 pm Woman 20 7 11 8 5 16 67
February 19, Man 20 18 10 6 28 20 102
2005 2 0.512
5 pm Woman 23 16 12 7 34 15 107
Note: WTT/CTT denotes the ratio between the woman talk duration and the couple talk duration.
Table 7: Individual talk durations in seconds.
17implement than the woman. Moreover, there is no clear time trend in the individual talk durations,
the average woman arguing slightly more in the last three investment series than in the ﬁrst three
investments series. It seems natural to relate the talk duration of an individual with his/her decision
power: the more an individual is arguing the more he/she is trying to inﬂuence the joint decision (and,
in most cases, he/she will probably be successful). In this respect, our quantitative analysis of the
couples discussions seems to corroborate our statistical analyses of the choice data: the man leads the
joint decision at least in the two ﬁrst investment series. But our previous analyses also suggested that
the man looses his inﬂuence on the joint decision in the third investment series because of the power
of ultimate control. We oﬀer now a ﬁnal evaluation of the impact of ultimate control by comparing
the woman relative talk duration when she has ultimate control to her relative talk duration when the
man has ultimate control. Figure 4 shows the woman relative talk duration in each investment series
averaged, on the one hand, over the 11 couples where the woman had ultimate control and averaged,


























WTT/CTT under ultimate control of the woman
WTT/CTT under ultimate control of the man
Note: WTT/CTT denotes the ratio between the woman talk duration and the couple talk duration.
Figure 4: Woman relative talk duration.
In the ﬁrst investment series, whether the woman has ultimate control or not does not inﬂuence
her talk duration. However, in investment series 8 and 9, a woman without ultimate control argues,
in relative terms, much more than a woman who has ultimate control. A similar tendency is observed
in the last part of the experimental session, i.e., in investment series 10 to 12. Under the natural
assumption that talk duration is related to decision power, we again conclude that the spouse who
has ultimate control gains additional inﬂuence on the decision of the couple.
185 Concluding comments
This article provides experimental evidence on the power of ultimate control. We refer to the power of
ultimate control as the additional decision power an individual gains when he/she implements the joint
decision he/she made with another individual. We considered two spouses who had ﬁrst to answer the
same set of questions in isolation and then had to answer the same questions as a couple. The ﬁrst set
of replies expresses the individual preferences, while the second expresses the collective preferences.
These joint decisions depend on the individual preferences but also on the relative decision power of
each spouse. We ﬁnd that the two main components which explain collective decision making under
risk are: gender (ceteris paribus, the man has more decision power than the woman) and ultimate
control (the individual implementing the joint decisions becomes more inﬂuential over time).
Based on our reduced sample, this computed decision power is not signiﬁcantly correlated with
the stated decision power, as declared separately by each spouse. The discrepancy between stated
and revealed preferences has been widely documented in the literature, especially on discrete choice
models (see, e.g., Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). We have found here that this discrepancy extends
to experimental economics data (versus survey data), and to decision power versus preferences. More
research on larger samples would be necessary in order to validate this preliminary ﬁnding. Similarly,
larger samples would be necessary in order to link stated and revealed decision power to distribution
factors (such as diﬀerence between spouses’ educational levels or ages or assets) used to identify
decision weights in collective models literature initiated by Chiappori (1988).
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